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The thesis of this paper is that thought experiments provide an especially 
powerful way to frame a class discussion. They work for students for the 
same reason that they have worked for great geniuses (such as Einstein) 
through the ages—namely, because they are interdisciplinary. Competing 
rationalist and empiricist accounts of how thought experiments work suggest 
that they will engage both rationally- and empirically-minded students. 
Examples of student responses to thought experiments confirm that they 
bring out interestingly diverse ways of thinking. Concern that inter-
disciplinary pedagogy makes genuine communication impossible has led 
some theorists to insist on a methodological pluralism that refuses to 
privilege any one approach. I argue however, that interdisciplinary instructors 
must ultimately ask students to incorporate their diverse perspectives into the 
discourse of the instructor’s discipline in order to ensure that their work is 
judged in accordance with a time-tested criterion of excellence. 
Introduction 
I began one of my classes this semester with the following thought 
experiment: 
You came to this room expecting a lecture, but this is a sting. My 
name is Agent Dana Scully, I am with the FBI, and you are under 
arrest. Please hand over your wallets, your cell phones, and your 
belts.…  What? You say you are innocent? Well, let me enumerate 
just a few of the laws you have broken lately:  first, traffic violation, 
which you commit just about every time you drive; second, copyright 
violation—pirated movies, and music—did you know that Time 
Warner owns the rights to the Happy Birthday song?; third, substance 
abuse—need I say more?; fourth, tax fraud, … the list goes on and 
on…. Still not willing to turn yourself in?  Let us take a vote. How 
many of you feel you are innocent?  Why? 
The question this thought experiment produces, “Do you really think you 
have the right to live in a country whose laws you regularly disobey?” is the 
very question Socrates posed before drinking the hemlock with which his 
fellow citizens sentenced him to death (Plato, 2002a, 45-57). It launches an 
exploration of justice, a concept central to many courses in higher education, 
including philosophy, sociology, religious studies, English literature, to name 
a few. 
 Thought experiments are an especially powerful way to frame a class 
discussion. They work for students for the same reason that they have worked 
for great geniuses (such as Einstein) through the ages—namely, because they 
are interdisciplinary.  
What is a thought experiment? 
A thought experiment is an imaginary scenario explored for the purpose of 
acquiring knowledge. Since the beginning of Western civilization, thought 
experiments have been used with great success in almost every field, from 
science, to ethics, to history (Rescher, pp. 61–72, 2005). 
 The ancient Roman philosopher Lucretius provides a classic example: 
Imagine throwing a spear at the edge of the universe. Either it will keep on 
going or it will hit a boundary. If it keeps on going, then you are not at the 
edge after all. But if it hits a boundary, then you are not at the edge either 
because a boundary is a divider with something on the other side. Lucretius 
believed this thought experiment proved that there is no edge—the universe 
must be infinitely large (Bailey, 1950, pp. 58–59). 
 There have been many competing accounts of the nature of thought 
experiment throughout history (Weber, 2003, pp. 28–38; Perler, 2008, pp. 
143–153. Brooks, 1994, pp. 71–83). More recently, Letitia Meynell argues 
that thought experiments are ultimately props for imagining fictional worlds 
(Meynell, 2014, pp. 4149–4168.). She identifies six distinctive features that 
are common among them. These features help us understand what a thought 
experiment is. 
 The first is imagery—whether in the form of a diagram or just a mental 
picture. Imagery serves to stimulate the imagination and to ensure that all 
parties to the conversation are focused on the same idea. Lucretius does not 
abstractly posit “a projectile,” he posits a spear—a very common object in his 
day.  In my classes, I use my best acting skills—to the point where students 
complain, “Stop! You’re scaring me!” The more concretely one can 
encapsulate the questions at hand, the more successful the thought 
experiment.  
 The second is experiential language. Lucretius does not ask us to imagine 
someone else throwing a spear. He puts us right there in outer space, poised 
to find out firsthand what happens to the spear. By casting us as the agent, not 
just an observer, Lucretius engages the senses as well as the intellect. We feel 
the spear; we see it fly. Likewise, I want my students to feel the cold metal of 
the handcuffs on their wrists. Through make-believe, we are fully engaged, 
the better to illicit authentic intuitions about the situation. 
 The third is an epistemological analysis, showing how the thought 
experiment justifies (or fails to justify) its conclusion. Though it is difficult to 
explain how imaginary scenarios produce knowledge, it is clear that we gain 
insight by understanding how they relate to our beliefs. Lucretius imagined a 
universe that must either have an edge or must go on infinitely because he 
assumed that space is Euclidean or flat. Today, space is no longer regarded as 
Euclidean, but rather curved in a complex way. Hence the thought 
experiment no longer regarded as providing insight into the way the world 
actually is. But this was only discovered by unearthing the beliefs underlying 
the scenario. Needless to say, there are competing accounts of how the beliefs 
involved in thought experimenting become knowledge (Clatterbuck, 2013, 
pp. 309–329). 
 Fourth is the irreducibly imaginative character of most thought 
experiments. While it might be possible to restate Lucretius’s case in purely 
propositional form, the same is not true of the FBI thought experiment from 
my classroom. This scenario is not so much trying to prove that you are not 
innocent, but rather that your assumption of innocence is problematic. In a 
similar vein, Lucretius’s thought experiment was, and still is, successful in so 
far as it proves that your assumption that the universe is finite is problematic. 
By serving up the problem rather than stating a conclusion, a thought 
experiment opens up conceptual space. This “laboratory of the mind” is 
characteristic of novels, plays, and other forms of fiction (Elgin, 1993, pp. 
13–28; 2007, pp. 43-54; and 2014, 221–241). 
 Fifth, thought experiments tend to admit of different interpretations and to 
provoke opposition. For example, Aristotle objected to Lucretius’s conclu-
sion on the grounds that the world could not rotate uniformly if it were 
infinite in size. His geometrical proof of this claim is highly abstract and 
hence never became as famous as its rival. A more modern objection along 
the same lines might be: How can the universe be infinite if it is expanding? 
At any rate, thought experiments are designed to provoke thoughts—to raise 
more questions than they answer.   
 Finally, and most significantly, thought experiments are objective even 
though they are not real. When people discuss a thought experiment, it is 
crucial that they agree to the “ground rules” of their make-believe world. If 
they imagine whatever they please and don’t fully reveal to one another what 
they are imagining, then they make no progress on the question at hand. As 
though playing a video-game together, they must construct a virtual reality of 
fictional truths. Disagreements often arise from different rules, and insights 
are often gained by bringing to light hidden or unspoken rules. Rather than 
being private and subjective, thought experiments specify distinctive 
cognitive content. In this way they have “being in their non-being” (Meinong, 
1907, 273–283). 
How do thought experiments work? 
Thought experiments are puzzling because we do not ordinarily think of 
imagination as a tool for knowledge acquisition. On the contrary, imagina-
tion, a fantasy about that which is not real, is commonly considered the 
opposite of fact, that which is real. How can a fantasy produce reliable 
information about reality? 
 Two competing answers to this question have emerged in the last ten 
years. We should consider them each in turn. 
 James R. Brown proposes that finely tuned imagination is actually a 
powerful form of mental perception. We all agree that physical perception—
sight, hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting—is a way of gathering data 
about the physical world. Likewise, mental perception gathers data about 
truths that transcend the physical world (Brown, 2004). 
 Brown characterizes his view as “Platonic” with reference to the ancient 
Greek philosopher Plato. One of Plato’s lifelong concerns was to identify a 
reliable source of truth. Rejecting physical perception as unreliable, he turned 
to mathematics as an ideal model. When we contemplate the equation 
a2+b2=c2 we “see” the truth with the mind’s “eye.”  This seems to imply that 
there is another world, beyond the physical world, for us to discover. Plato 
called it the world of Forms (Plato, 2002b, pp. 91–3). He believed that human 
beings must have had access to this world before we were born since 
perceiving it feels like remembering. 
 For Brown, thought experimenting can provide a highly effective form of 
mental perception. When Lucretius imagined himself throwing a spear at the 
edge of the universe, he discovered something true that he could never 
perceive physically. This suggests that mental perception is not limited to 
math but can be extended to any area of inquiry (Brown, 2010, pp. 1–15). 
Brown’s account is called “rationalist” because it holds that human beings 
can acquire knowledge through pure reason, without depending on physical 
perception. 
 John D. Norton presents the opposing empiricist account of how thought 
experiments work. In Norton’s view, Plato’s world of Forms does not exist. 
All knowledge comes either directly or indirectly from physical perception. 
Even mathematical equations such as a2+b2=c2 have an empirical source: 
they are abstracted from our observations of physical objects. Likewise, when 
Lucretius imagined throwing a spear at the edge of the universe, he 
extrapolated from his real life experience (Norton, 2004b, pp. 44–66). 
 Norton maintains that every thought experiment is really an argument in 
disguise (Norton, 2004a, pp. 1139–1151). Lucretius’s thought experiment, for 
example, may be reconstructed as follows: 
1. If the universe is finite, then it is surrounded by a final boundary.
2. But no boundary can be final because there always has to be
something on the other side.
3. Therefore, the universe must be infinite.
We can picture Lucretius using his thought experiment to convince his 
opponents of his conclusion.  
 Norton contends, against Brown, that there is no reason to suppose 
Lucretius’s thought experiment helped him to discover his conclusion. Surely 
the discovery came through reflection on ordinary empirical observation of 
various kinds of physical boundaries. The human mind is able to collect data 
from repeated experience and then construct abstract representations of things 
it is unable to experience. For example, we construct the idea of a perfect 
triangle by abstracting imperfections from the various physical triangles we 
encounter every day. Like Plato’s illustrious student Aristotle, Norton insists 
that there is no justification for supposing that human beings can remember a 
transcendent world in which such truths exist. The mind is born a blank slate 
(Aristotle, 1986, 3.4.430a1). 
 Brown and Norton occupy opposite ends of the spectrum in explaining 
how thought experiments work. For Brown, thought experiments focus the 
mental perception that enables humans to discover transcendent truths. For 
Norton, they provide convincing illustrations for arguments rooted in 
empirical observation. I maintain, however, that these rival theories are not 
mutually exclusive from a pedagogical point of view. 
 The first clue to the underlying value of thought experiment comes from 
noticing that they very often don’t produce true conclusions at all. Lucretius’s 
spear, for example, doesn’t actually prove that the universe is infinite at all. 
This thought experiment fails because the thought experimenter has 
overlooked the fact that it is actually possible for a surface to both be 
finite and have no edge; the surface of a sphere is an example. The 
thought experimenter mistakenly saw a contradiction when there is 
none (Cooper 343). 
Newton’s thought experiments overturned those of his ancient predecessors; 
Einstein’s overturned Newton’s, and recent thought experiments in quantum 
mechanics overturned Einstein’s. Science continues to progress as do all 
other fields of inquiry. We have not settled upon the final answer. 
 And yet, each moment of overturning is flash of brilliant insight. If we do 
not learn the final answers in those moments, exactly what do we learn? 
 In those moments we learn about how we think. We see the power of a 
particular line of logic. We see the workings of the human mind at its best. 
While this thinking about thinking plays out with searing intensity at the 
professional level, it can be profitably modeled among amateurs in the 
classroom. As Elke Brendel writes,  
the long and sometimes fruitless debate in epistemology between 
internalist and externalist approaches to knowledge could indicate that 
there is not just one single concept of knowledge but at least two 
different concepts, each of which reflects different features of 
knowledge…. With the help of thought experiments these divergent, 
but legitimate concepts of knowledge can be clarified (2004, p. 104). 
In a similar vein, Jeremy Goodenough documents how a single thought 
experiment described in two different ways can lead the same people to 
opposite conclusions. He concludes that their value lies in the shedding light 
on the ways in which we think and feel (2011, p. 12). Intellectuals benefit 
from understanding the workings of intellect as much as the mechanic 
benefits from understanding the workings of the machine. 
 Since no one knows for sure whether or not a transcendent realm of truths 
exists, we cannot determine once and for all whether Plato or Aristotle was 
correct. One thing of which we can be quite certain, however, is that some 
students are rationalists and others are empiricists. In a classic article, Felder 
and Silverman synthesize findings from a number of studies to identify 
contrasting learning styles (Felder, R.M. and L.K. Silverman, 1988, pp. 674–
681). They define a student’s learning style by the answers to four questions: 
· What type of information does the student prefer:  sensory (sights,
sounds, and physical sensations), or intuitive (memories, ideas,
and insights)?
· How is information received:  visual (pictures, diagrams, graphs,
and demonstrations), or verbal (sounds, written and spoken words,
and formulas)?
· How do they process information: actively (through engagement in
physical activity or discussion) or reflectively (through
introspection)?
· How does the student progress toward understanding:  sequentially
(in a logical progression of small incremental steps), or globally
(in large jumps, absorbing material randomly)? (Wirz, 2004, p. 2)
The dimensions of this model are a matter of degree and a student’s pre-
ference for the different styles may change with time or from one subject to 
another. Yet the data clearly suggests that some students learn best 
“intuitively” from formulas and principles while others learn best “sensorily” 
from hands-on experiences or concrete examples. These are the rationalist 
and empiricist, respectively. 
 Regardless of whether or not Brown is correct to posit a transcendent 
world, he is certainly correct to suggest that thought experiments focus 
mental perception in a productive way for those who are rationalistically 
inclined. Likewise, Norton is correct to suggest that, for those who are 
empirically inclined, thought experiments can illustrate an argument in a 
uniquely compelling way. We can set aside the ancient metaphysical debate 
over transcendent truth while agreeing that rationalist and empiricist 
approaches to learning are equally important. The fundamental value of 
thought experimenting is to reveal these divergent approaches at work.  
The interdisciplinary nature of thought experiments 
Interdisciplinary is the combination of academic disciplines or schools of 
thought to produce new perspectives and solutions (Augsburg, 2005). In 
addition to combining philosophy, history, literature, drama, science, and 
theology at a surface level, at a deeper level, thought experimenting combines 
rationalist and empiricist schools of thought. In this way it reminds us why all 
our disciplines are called “arts and sciences” in the first place: the place 
where intuition and observation meet. 
 As we’ve seen, Lucretius provides us with a simple scientific thought 
experiment. Its interdisciplinarity stems primarily from its invitation to both 
rationalist and empiricist analysis. Judith Jarvis Thomson provides a famous 
example of a much more complicated ethics thought experiment that is 
interdisciplinary on another level (1971, pp. 47–8). 
 You wake up in the hospital to find a famous violinist dependent on you 
for life support. He is attached to you through various tubes and will need 
you to remain in bed next to him for nine months. Exactly how and why this 
happened can be elaborated in a number of different ways. For our purposes, 
suffice it to say that when I present it to the students I tell them that at the end 
of the class period we are going to take a vote: will you sacrifice a significant 
portion of your life to save this stranger or will you pull the plug?  
The student reactions are interesting. Here is a sampling: 
“I’m going to sue the paramedic who did this to me without my 
permission!” 
“But if you pull the plug, you kill him. Killing an innocent person is 
murder, which violates the sixth commandment.” 
“Killing isn’t the same as letting him die. I have the right to my body; 
he doesn’t have a right to it.”  
In these three reactions, we see a legalistic thinker, a theological thinker, and 
a political thinker hashing it out. Thomson used the thought experiment as a 
model for thinking about abortion. This adds a literary dimension: does the 
violinist scenario provide an apt comparison to an unwanted pregnancy? 
Students have a lot to say about that too. Their writing assignment for this 
week will be to take a position on the question of whether or not abortion is 
ever morally permissible. The students always express a wide variety of 
views on this issue because they know, by observing the neutral role I adopt 
in facilitating the thought experiment, that I will not judge them according to 
what position they take, but rather according to how well they argue for it. 
 Back in my lecturing days I always had trouble explaining to my students 
how the theory of evolution challenges the argument from design, according 
to which, as Thomas Aquinas famously argues, God must exist because only 
he could have created such an extraordinarily complex system of nature 
(1996–1997, Part 1, Article 3, Question 2). Now I get the point across with 
the help of a thought experiment.  
 I tell the students that the CDC has learned that they and everyone in their 
generation is barren. The human race will soon be extinct. However, we have 
discovered that the apelike species from which we evolved is still alive in 
Africa. If we put some members of this species into an “evolution 
accelerator” we can evolve a new race of humans before our race dies out. 
Again, they are required to vote: should we do it? 
A sample of common student reactions: 
“How could humans create other humans from animals? They would 
lack the divine spark that makes us different from the animals.” 
“How could evolution be accomplished in such a short time? It would 
take millions of years and the random mutations might lead to some 
creature other than human.” 
“How would the new race interact with our old race?  Would we 
intermix or keep them separate and would we tell them that we made 
them?” 
In these reactions, a theological thinker, a scientific thinker and a sociological 
thinker pushes the limits of their understanding. Their writing assignment for 
the week will not directly concern this thought experiment. It will ask them to 
take a position on whether or not evolution defeats the design argument for 
the existence of God. In my experience, not only do the students have more 
fun in class, imagining and laughing about strange possibilities, they also 
produce higher quality papers. 
 Finally I will mention one of my favorite class thought experiments: what 
if you alone exist and all of reality is, as René Descartes suggested, an 
illusion imposed on you by an evil genius? (1993, bk. I) This is a deep, 
purely philosophical meditation. And yet it is perennially popular. It takes a 
while to explain to the students why, under these circumstances, they cannot 
know whether the world exists, or whether they have a body, or whether any 
of their memories are true. Once they understand the dire nature of their 
situation, however, they spontaneously recreate Descartes’ moment of 
eureka, each in their own way. At the hands of this evil genius, I ask them, 
what can you be certain of? 
“That I exist.” 
“That I am perceiving something.” 
“That I am thinking.” 
Here we have a barebones confrontation between an ontological thinker, an 
empiricist, and a rationalist. They are each right within their own systems. 
 When teaching through thought experiments, the instructor is forced to 
refrain from imposing a hidden agenda on the discussion. By exploring a 
problematic scenario and then being required to vote on its resolution, 
students discover how they think in contrast to how others think; they have to 
decide for themselves the best way to the truth. Hence this pedagogy is a 
propaedeutic to professor proselytizing in the university. As Oskar 
Gruenwald, editor of the Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, argues, “the 
university needs to re-dedicate itself to the search for truth about ourselves 
and the world without cant and politically correct ideologies” (2011, p. 16). 
Thought experimenting is a specific proposal for how to accomplish this in 
the classroom. 
The challenge of interdisciplinary pedagogy 
So far I have argued that thought experiments promote interdisciplinary 
classroom discussions and that these are valuable in university education 
because they fostering each student’s individual approach to the search for 
truth. 
 Nevertheless, interdisciplinary pedagogy is challenging due to its 
complexity. As Harvard education researcher Zachary Stein et al. argue,  
Interdisciplinary syntheses are among the most epistemologically 
complex endeavours that humans can attempt. This complexity arises 
primarily from the deep differences of perspective that must be 
bridged in order to carry out interdisciplinary projects. That is, 
different methods and disciplines frame different perspectives and 
thus generate different kinds of knowledge (2008, p. 402).  
Stein et al. report the results of an experiment aimed at gaging the value of 
interdisciplinary discussions among professionals. In one such experiment, an 
accomplished mathematician and an accomplished neuroscientist were asked 
to discuss problems at the intersection of their fields. Analysing the transcrip-
tions, Stein et al. write, 
These conversations were attempts to advance knowledge by bringing 
together and synthesising diverse and sophisticated perspectives on 
issues of great importance (from mathematics to morality and from 
physics to politics). But instead of reading like constructive dialogues, 
these conversations often read like a set of juxtaposed monologues. In 
both cases the two experts find it difficult to avoid privileging the 
methodological perspectives they hold dear. And all too often the 
result is disciplinary ships passing in the epistemological night. (2008, 
p. 405)
Stein et al. conclude that the experiments demonstrate that interdisciplinary 
studies are prone to two problems that stem from differences between levels 
of analysis and differences between basic viewpoints. Let us look at each in 
turn in connection with a course in the bioethics of learning disabilities.  
 The levels of analysis problem arises when discussants are using different 
explanatory frameworks. One discussant may be interested in understanding 
how various pathologies are diagnosed and treated, while another is interest-
ed in understanding how they are accommodated within the school system. 
Although each discussant uses the term “ADHD” accurately, one has a 
biological understanding of it; the other, institutional.  
 The basic viewpoints problem arises when discussants start with 
incompatible assumptions about the world. One discussant may believe that 
the term “ADHD” names a genuinely debilitating physiological disorder 
while another believes it to be a largely imagined psychosomatic condition. 
Although the discussants may agree that school systems need to offer 
accommodations for students with ADHD, they may strongly disagree about 
their extent. 
 Stein et al. call for a commitment to methodological pluralism as a means 
of addressing both of these problems. By methodological pluralism they seem 
to imply that instructors of interdisciplinary courses should avoid privileging 
any one methodology over another. They should explicitly respect and call 
attention to the different levels of analysis and different basic viewpoints 
without attempting to reduce them to a single approach. 
 In my view, the problem with this proposal is that a professor trained in 
one field is really in no position to instruct students in areas outside of that 
area of specialization. How is a historian to evaluate the kind of knowledge 
generated by a budding psychologist? Will she be able to distinguish good 
psychological methodology from bad? If not, then methodological pluralism 
just opens the door to anything goes—a “free-for-all” gab session with no 
educational value whatsoever. 
 While I fully endorse Stein et al.’s insistence on respecting and calling 
attention to differences, I think there is a sense in which different approaches 
must be reduced or at least subordinated to a single approach within a course. 
Although my class discussions are interdisciplinary, my class is still a 
philosophy class. This means that the papers the students write for their final 
grades are philosophy papers. I am trained in philosophy. I am not competent 
to judge a literature paper or a psychology paper. Hence the literary and 
psychological thinkers in my class will have to learn how to incorporate their 
insights into philosophical discourse. I would expect the same subordination 
to occur in any interdisciplinary course. The very term “interdisciplinary,” 
after all, presupposes the underlying presence of the disciplines. The 
disciplines demarcate powerful methodologies that establish criteria of 
excellence. Although these methodologies change and grow slowly over 
time, it is still up to instructors who have mastered these methodologies to 
pass them on to the next generation. 
 Hence it seems that, as Jennifer Jesse, co-editor of the American Journal 
of Theology and Philosophy, argues, one cannot be interdisciplinary without 
being self-consciously so (2011, p. 72). In fact, being interdisciplinary largely 
amounts to introducing a metanarrative into class discussions that constantly 
highlights the plurality of our thinking with the aim of ultimately unifying us 
in the age-old quest for truth.  
Conclusion 
We may agree that lecturing creates a perniciously passive classroom, but 
how to create a lively and meaningful discussion?  Playing the usual “I ask 
and you answer” game creates a predictable and inauthentic exchange. 
Thought experiment, in contrast, is spontaneous, mutually insightful for 
teacher and student, and fun. Thought experiment is the sine qua non of 
philosophy; catalogues of famous and not so famous ones can readily be 
found (Schick, 2013; Tittle, 2004). But remember: philosophy is the mother 
of all the disciplines. To this extent philosophy is a welcome complement to 
any university course, from history (De Mey, 2003), to economics 
(Stringham, 2008), to math (Clegg, 2003, pp. 239–242). 
 University education should aim to produce philosophical historians, 
philosophical economists, and philosophical mathematicians. What is the 
distinguishing mark of the philosopher? According to Edouard Machery, 
Sorbonne educated Resident Fellow of the Center for Philosophy of Science 
at the University of Pittsburgh, 
philosophers are less likely to blindly accept their intuitions and more 
likely to submit those intuitions to scrutiny. Philosophers ponder; they 
question what spontaneously seems to be the case; they readily take a 
skeptical eye toward how things seem to them (2011, p. 211). 
By thought experimenting about what is possible, philosophers learn to 
question what is allegedly actual. By reflecting on their own and others’ 
thought processes, they learn to trust the process of inquiry rather than 
authority.  
 How can we ensure that the university will continue to be a source of 
knowledge and inspiration for the next generation and into the future? Oskar 
Gruenwald argues, “Philosophy can help here in suggesting not only the 
obvious distinctions concerning appropriate methodologies in the natural 
sciences, social sciences, and humanities, but also concerning the need for 
more global, interdisciplinary approaches for greater understanding” (1999, 
p. 163). As the number of disciplines continues to multiply and the 
interconnections among them become increasingly complicated, the 
university must stay rooted in its philosophical past and thought experiment 
is a promising way to accomplish this.
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